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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most prominent aspects of American popular culture is
major league sports.1 They are pervasive, not only in economic and
political arenas, but also within the spheres of community values and
ethics.2 We look to athletes as bastions of morality and social
consciousness, which puts a heavy emphasis on sports leagues and how
they adjudicate the conduct of athletes both on and off the field.3 This is
why the recent cheating scandal perpetrated by the New England Patriots
and, most likely, Tom Brady garnered national and legal attention.
Specifically, the improper conduct involved Tom Brady using
underinflated footballs in the 2015 American Football Conference
(“AFC”) Championship game.4 As a result, not only was Brady
suspended, but the New England Patriots were fined $1 million and lost
two future draft picks.5 These punitive measures were dictated by Roger
Goodell, the National Football League (“NFL”) Commissioner, who
serves as arbitrator for all team and player disciplinary issues. 6 This
“Deflategate” incident, particularly the severity of the commissioner’s
sanction, illustrates the magnitude of a sports commissioner’s power.
The NFL Commissioner’s power, however, is not unique; commissioners
in other major sports leagues—Major League Baseball (“MLB”),
National Basketball Association (“NBA”), National Hockey League
(“NHL”)—have doled out equally strong sanctions.7
The
commissioners’ power to discipline players and teams for misconduct
comes from the respective Collective Bargaining Agreements (“CBAs”)
of each league, as well as the leagues’ constitutions and by-laws.8
In the case of Roger Goodell, under the terms of the 2011 NFL CBA,
“[t]he System [Commissioner] shall make findings of fact and
determinations of relief including, without limitation, damages . . .

1

Kenneth J. Marci, Not Just a Game: Sport and Society in the United States, 4 INQUIRIES
J., no. 8 (2012), http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=676.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
David Bunam & Rich Cimini, NFL Suspends Tom Brady for 4 Games, ESPN (May
12, 2015), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/12867594/punishments-handed-tom-bradynew-england-patriots-deflategate.
5
Id.
6
Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council
and the Nat’l Football Players Ass’n, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT (Aug. 4, 2011), http://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-barg
aining-agreement-2011-2020.pdf [hereinafter 2011 NFL CBA].
7
Adriano Pacifici, Scope and Authority of Sports League Commissioner Disciplinary
Power: Bounty and Beyond, 3 BERKELEY J. ENT. & SPORTS L. 93 (2014).
8
Id.

MONDELLI

2017]

2017

THE ROGER GOODELL STANDARD

193

injunctive relief, fines, and specific performance.”9 There are no
provisions that currently limit this power, prompting scholars to propose
alterations to NFL regulations.10 Many associated with the league believe
the unfettered authority afforded to Goodell under the new CBA is unfair,
with no analogues in other major sports leagues.11 The power is so
disconcerting to some that they are anxiously awaiting the year 2021,
when the CBA will be renegotiated and there will be an opportunity to
address Goodell’s authority.12 For the first time in recent memory, ratings
for the NFL dropped, possibly due to an unprecedented public backlash
over the league’s authority based on the handling of various player and
team issues, especially Deflategate.13
The issue with commissioner authority in the major sports leagues
is that it unfairly prejudices the players and coaches, placing their actions
under a microscope on and off the field, court, or ice. However, while
some argue that the power of the NFL Commissioner exceeds that of
other leagues,14 this Note posits that his authority is not incongruous with
that of other sports commissioners and that the commissioner authority
across all leagues is too broad. The issue with their authority revolves
around their unfettered ability to punish players for both on and off field
activities due to the ubiquity of “the best interest of the league” clause.
Part II of the Note will examine the CBAs of each of the four major sports
leagues in the United States—based on highest revenues,15 similarities in
textual construction, and popularity amongst the American people—to
elucidate the similarities in the powers of the commissioners. 16 Part III
will examine the Deflategate controversy, specifically, in order to show
how the issues of review result in the plenary authority of sports
commissioners. Part IV proposes legislation that would ameliorate these

9

Id. at 113.
Eric L. Einhorn, Between the Hash Marks: The Absolute Power the NFL’s Collective
Bargaining Agreement Grants Its Commissioner, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 393, 395 (2016).
11
Pacifici, supra note 7, at 94.
12
Kevin Van Valkenburg, Power Mad, ESPN (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.espn.com
/nfl/story/_/id/8769645/has-nfl-commissioner-roger-goodell-power-gone-too-far-espn-maga
zine.
13
Kevin Seifert, NFL Facing Unprecedented Rebellion From Teams, Players, ESPN
(Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.espn.com/blog/nflnation/post/_/id/218163/nfl-facing-unprece
dented-rebellion-from-the-inside.
14
Pacifici, supra note 7, at 94.
15
Steven Kutz, NFL Took in $13 Billion in Revenue Last Season—See How It Stack Up
Against Other Pro Sports Leagues, MARKET WATCH (July 2, 2016), http://www.market
watch.com/story/the-nfl-made-13-billion-last-season-see-how-it-stacks-up-against-otherleagues-2016-07-01.
16
Darren Rovell, NFL Most Popular For 30th Year in a Row, ESPN (Jan. 26, 2014),
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/10354114/harris-poll-nfl-most-popular-mlb-2nd.
10
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issues of review, while also expediting CBA negotiations, thus saving
leagues valuable time and revenue.
II. THE POWERS THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE NFL, MLB, NBA, AND NHL
The focus of commissioner review is based on the constitutions and
by-laws,17 because they lay out the original powers of the commissioners
that are then limited, qualified, or altered. Then the focus should shift to
the CBAs, whose functions are to detail qualified commissioner authority
for the period that they are valid, before the new player and league
negotiations take place.18
One must first look at the constitutions and by-laws because they
can be clearer in enumerating the exact powers of the commissioner,
making them important benchmarks for their authority.19
“Historically, league commissioners have enjoyed expansive
authority to regulate their leagues. The constitutions and by-laws for each
league are the starting points in defining the authority of each league
[C]omission.”20 CBAs are significant because they offer “professional
athletes an opportunity to impose checks on commissioner power, such
as rule change restrictions and arbitration processes, while also reserving
certain powers for the commissioner.”21 Any real disparity between
commissioner powers enumerated in the CBAs can be accounted for by
the relative power of the players’ union of the respective leagues.22 As a
result, the stronger the players’ union, the weaker the authority of the
commissioner under the CBA is likely to be.23
A. The MLB Commissioner’s Authority
In terms of the MLB, the MLB Player’s Association (“MLBPA”) is
quite strong due to the league’s long history, with nearly a century of
player-Commissioner negotiations, and is, ostensibly, able to put
significant restrictions on the power of the Commissioner in the CBA.24
However, under both the Constitution and the CBA, the Commissioner
has pervasive authority for disciplinary purposes.25
Under the
17
Michael R. Wilson, Why So Stern?: The Growing Power of the NBA Commissioner, 7
DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 48 (2010).
18
Kevin J. Murphy, Determinants of Contract Duration in Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 45 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 352, 352 (1992).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Wilson, supra note 17.
24
Wilson, supra note 17.
25
Collective Bargaining Agreement between the 30 Major League Clubs and the Major

MONDELLI

2017]

2017

THE ROGER GOODELL STANDARD

195

Constitution, the Commissioner has the authority to impose the
following:
(a) a reprimand; (b) deprivation of a Major League Club of
representation in Major League Meetings; (c) suspension or
removal of any owner, officer or employee of a Major League
Club; (d) temporary or permanent ineligibility of a player; (e)
a fine, not to exceed $2,000,000 in the case of a Major League
Club, not to exceed $500,000 in the case of an owner, officer
or employee, and in an amount consistent with the thencurrent Basic Agreement with the Major League Baseball
Players Association, in the case of a player; (f) loss of the
benefit of any or all of the Major League Rules, including but
not limited to the denial or transfer of player selection rights
provided by Major League Rules 4 and 5; and (g) such
other
actions as the Commissioner may deem appropriate.26
The Commissioner is also a member of the Executive Council, an
entity comprised of eight team owners, or “chairmen,”27 responsible for
protecting the position of baseball in public confidence and investigating
whether or not there should be rule changes regarding various matters.28
Under the Constitution, the phrase “best interests of baseball” has been
utilized to broadly extend the authority of the Commissioner.29 The
phrase was cited numerous times by various Commissioners in
justification of the punitive actions taken against players. 30
In terms of the CBA, “a Player may be subjected to disciplinary
action for just cause by his Club, the Senior Vice President, Standards
and On-Field Operations or the Commissioner.”31 However, when a
player feels as though he was punished unfairly, he may file a grievance
in order to be made whole, subsequent to the punishment.32 The
legitimacy of the grievance is determined by either a panel chair or, more
commonly, by a tripartite committee of arbiters, with two of the arbiters
being supplied by each party and an impartial third arbiter selected by
both.33 If the parties do not agree upon an impartial arbiter from the
League Baseball Players Ass’n, 2012-2016 Basic Agreement, (2016), art. XII, https://ipmall.
law.unh.edu/sites/default/files/hosted_resources/SportsEntLaw_Institute/2012MLB_MLBP
A_CBA.pdf [hereinafter 2012-2016 MLB CBA]; MAJOR LEAGUE CONST., art. II (1921),
https://ipmall.law.unh.edu/sites/default/files/hosted_resources/SportsEntLaw_Institute/Leag
ue%20Constitutions%20&%20Bylaws/MLConsititutionJune2005Update.pdf.
26
Id. at art. II, § 3.
27
Id. at art. II, § 1.
28
Id. at art. III, § 2.
29
Michael Hirsley, ‘Best Interests’ Clause Has Benefited Commissioners, CHI. TRIBUNE
(Mar. 18, 2004), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-03-18/sports/0403180405_1_fayvincent-interests-commissioners.
30
Id.
31
2012-2016 MLB CBA, supra note 25, at art. XII.
32
2012-2016 MLB CBA, supra note 25, at art. XI.
33
2012-2016 MLB CBA, supra note 25, at art. XI.
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Association and the Labor Relations Department (“LDR”), they must
jointly request that the American Arbitration Association provide them
with a list of appropriate candidates.34 Similar to the process of voir dire,
the parties go down the list until one name is agreed upon.35 However,
either party may remove the arbiter at any time during the negotiations.36
Essentially, the Commissioner, as the head of the league, has more
bargaining power in these situations because he can delay the proceedings
and select the arbiter that he wants to adjudicate the matters, even though
it technically violates the CBA.37
While it is true that both the players and the league can take
advantage of these procedural loopholes, pressure from fans and owners
coupled with the risk of losing income allow the league to draw out the
process.38 Instances where grievances are appropriate are limited to
conduct on the field and in the ballpark.39 That still leaves “[t]hose
complaints that involve the preservation of the integrity of the game to be
different from the routine grievances of an industrial employment
relationship, and it is understandable that the commissioner of baseball
believes that he must have final and binding authority to resolve such
complaints.”40 As evidenced by the detailed powers of the MLB
Commissioner, his authority is far-reaching.
B. The NHL Commissioner’s Authority
The position of the NHL Commissioner—currently held by Gary
Bettman—does not date back to the 1920s, like the MLB
Commissioner.41 Instead, the position of NHL Commissioner was
created in 1993, with its powers amended under the NHL Constitution in
2009.42 Similar to the role of the MLB Commissioner, the NHL
Commissioner is “charged with protecting the integrity of the game of
professional hockey and preserving public confidence in the league,”43
which gives the Commissioner broad discretionary power over matters:
34

2012-2016 MLB CBA, supra note 25, at art. XI.
2012-2016 MLB CBA, supra note 25, at art. XI.
36
2012-2016 MLB CBA, supra note 25, at art. XI.
37
See 2012-2016 MLB CBA, supra note 25, at art. XI.
38
Mark L. Goldstein, Arbitration of Grievance and Salary Disputes in Professional
Baseball Evolution of a System of Private Law, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1073-74 (1975).
39
Id.
40
Id. at 1073.
41
Joe Lapointe, HOCKEY; The N.H.L. Employs A Head Of Business, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
13, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/13/sports/hockey-the-nhl-employs-a-head-forbusiness.html.
42
Pacifici, supra note 7, at 101.
43
NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE, CONST., art. 6 (1993), http://sportsdocuments.com/2013/11
/nhl-constitution/.
35
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The specific disciplinary powers of the NHL Commissioner
are laid out in Section 6(j) of the NHL Constitution.44 The
Commissioner has broad authority to punish a person
connected with the league or a Member Club for
violation of
the league’s Constitution, By-Laws, or CBA.45 Any such
action can occur during or outside the season, so long 46as the
violation in question is detrimental to the league.
In
accordance with Section 6(j)(1), depending on the nature and
severity of the violation, the Commissioner may take action
against an unruly player or Member Club through various
disciplinary methods such as expelling or suspending players,
cancelling contracts, imposing steep monetary fines 47or team
draft pick penalties, and compelling player transfers.
The Commissioner’s determinations are also “final and not subject
to any review,” which further compounds the Commissioner’s extensive
powers to admonish members of the league.48
It might appear under the new CBA that the Commissioner’s powers
have been limited, but this would be inaccurate.49 Under Article 18.13 of
the NHL’s CBA, a player receiving a suspension of six games or more
can circumvent the Commissioner’s plenary authority and appeal to a
Neutral Discipline Arbitrator (“NDA”).50 The NDA shall “hold an inperson hearing and shall determine whether the final decision of the
League regarding whether the Player’s conduct violated the League
Playing Rules and whether the length of the suspension imposed was
supported by substantial evidence.”51 This secondary review “shall be
binding and not subject to further review.”52 Before the implementation
of the NHL’s CBA, the only instances in which the Commissioner’s
decisions could be reviewed were: (1) when there was an expulsion from
the league or a suspension of more than two years, or (2) when there was
an imposition of a penalty that coincided with Section 6(j)(1)(d). 53 In
those instances, the player would have to appeal to the Board of

44

Id.
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Pacifici, supra note 7, at 102.
50
Nat’l Hockey League & Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Ass’n, Collective Bargaining
Agreement, art. 18, § 13 (Sept. 16, 2012). Collective Bargaining Agreement between the
Nat’l Hockey League and the Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Ass’n, art. XIIIV, § 13 (Feb. 2,
2013), http://cdn.agilitycms.com/nhlpacom/PDF/NHL_NHLPA_2013_CBA.pdf [hereinafter
2013 NHL CBA].
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE, CONST., art. 6 (1993), http://sportsdocuments.com/2013/11
/nhl-constitution/.
45
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Governors, and could only prevail with a three-fourths majority vote.54
Despite the changes made to the appeals process, there are those who
still believe that the Commissioner has complete control over the NHL. 55
Holding the position for twenty-three years now, and having weathered
three lockouts, Commissioner Bettman has increased revenue from $400
million to $3.3 billion, garnering the support of the owners. 56 “I think
he’s emperor for life,” said Jonathon Gatehouse, author of the first indepth biography on Commissioner Bettman.57 In furtherance of his
outright authority, Article 6.4 indemnifies the Commissioner from a
range of pecuniary obligations, including damages and legal fees,
provided that he act in good faith and in furtherance of the league.58 It
would seem, despite the best efforts of the National Hockey League
Players’ Association, that Commissioner Bettman has comprehensive
disciplinary authority.
C. The NBA Commissioner’s Authority
As previously mentioned, it is commonly held that the NFL
Commissioner has the most inherent power of any other league
commissioner; however, a close examination of the NBA
Commissioner’s authority brings that assertion into question. Beyond
direct disciplinary action, one of the strongest powers of the NBA
Commissioner is the ability to “promulgate and enforce reasonable rules
governing the conduct of players on the court or conduct that is harmful
to the preservation of the integrity of, or the maintenance of public
confidence in, the game.”59 The NBA Commissioner’s ability to generate
rules is arguably the most extensive of the four major sports leagues.60
The NBA CBA also does not limit the rulemaking authority to conduct
matters “on the playing court” and, instead, refers to “conduct in any area
of the Arena.”61 “[A]ny area of the Arena” includes, but is not limited to,
54

Id.
Jeff Z. Klein, Bettman Undisputed N.H.L. Enforcer, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2012)
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/sports/hockey/on-hockey-bettman-is-the-undisputednhl-enforcer.html.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE, CONST., art. 6 (1993), http://sportsdocuments.com/2013/11
/nhl-constitution/.
59
Wilson, supra note 17, at 49 (quoting Collective Bargaining Agreement between the
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n and the Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, NBA Collective Bargaining
Agreement, art. VI, § 12 (2011), https://www.scribd.com/doc/172760974/NBA-NBPA-CBA2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
60
Wilson, supra note 17, at 49 (citing Brent D. Showalter, Technical Foul: David Stern’s
Excessive Use of Rule-Making Authority, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 205, 215 (2007)).
61
Wilson, supra note 17, at 49; see Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Nat’l
55
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“locker rooms, dormitories, loading docks, and other back-of-house and
underground areas, including those used by television production and
other vehicles . . . at, during or in connection with an NBA Exhibition,
All-Star, Regular Season or Playoff game.”62 Under the CBA, there is no
requirement for the NBA to provide notice, negotiate, or receive consent
before enacting any rule changes.63
The authority of the NBA Commissioner to enforce disciplinary
action is both subsumed under his ability to generate rules and expressed
in CBA Article XXXI, Section 9.64 The extent of this authority, and how
it can be disputed, is outlined in Article XXXI of the NBA’s CBA.65 This
article lays out the “grievance and arbitration procedure and special
procedures with respect to disputes involving player discipline.”66 Player
discipline is broken down into two categories: suspension for twelve
games or less and suspension for twelve games or more.67 For a
suspension under twelve games issued by the Commissioner or his
designee, there is no grievance review process and, thus, it will not be
reviewable by an arbitrator.68 This punishment is disputable only to the
commissioner—the person whose authority the suspension invokes—so,
this subsequent ruling on appeal is final.69 However, the financial impact
of such a suspension, whether it is through fine or loss of wages, may be
reviewed by the Player Discipline Arbitrator.70 The Player Discipline
Arbitrator may either maintain or lower, but not extend, the financial
penalty on the player, and must keep all considerations private.71
The guidelines in Section 9(b) of this Article dictate the procedure
for situations involving players suspended for twelve games or more.72
Such suspensions involve either player conduct or the protection of the
integrity of the sport.73 Section 9(b) grants either the player or the union
the ability to file for a review of the suspension.74 Sections 2–7 of this
Basketball Ass’n and the Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, NBA Collective Bargaining
Agreement, art. XXXI, § 9(c) (2011), https://www.scribd.com/doc/172760974/NBA-NBPACBA-2011 [hereinafter 2011 NBA CBA].
62
Wilson, supra note 17, at 49; 2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61.
63
Wilson, supra note 17, at 49.
64
Wilson, supra note 17, at 49; 2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9.
65
2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI.
66
2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI.
67
2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(a)-(b).
68
2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(a).
69
2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(a)(1)-(3).
70
2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(a)(5).
71
2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(a)(5)(b)-(c).
72
2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(b).
73
2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(b).
74
2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(b) (referring to Sec. 2(a).
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Article articulate the exact procedure of the review.75 These proceedings
are similar to court cases.76 There are pre-hearing motions, discovery,
full hearings, and final rulings handed down by the Grievance
Arbitrator.77 Like the MLB, either party can discharge the Grievance
Arbitrator at any time before the Grievance Arbitrator delivers the final
ruling.78 If the parties cannot agree on a new arbitrator, the parties shall
jointly request a list of eleven attorneys from the International Institute
for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (“the CPR Institute”).79 If the
parties cannot decide on a new arbitrator from that list, each party may
eliminate up to five names before returning the list to the CPR Institute,
who will then make a final selection.80 However, if at any time the
Commissioner believes that the matter, in its essence, involves the
integrity of the sport, he may implement the appeals procedure for
penalties under twelve games, outlined supra.81 While it may seem that
the Commissioner does not have complete authority to discipline
players,82 the CBA grants the Commissioner full discretion in
suspensions for twelve games and under and near-unfettered control in
suspensions involving over twelve games.83
D. The NFL Commissioner’s Authority
The handling of the Deflategate scandal sparked the most recent
issue of commissioner disciplinary authority. While the NFL CBA is the
primary source of the Commissioner’s authority, the NFL Constitution
also sets forth important powers.84 “Article VIII of the NFL constitution
details the commissioner’s power to resolve disputes and to take action
against a person connected with the league when the person engages in
conduct detrimental to the league.”85 In this capacity,
The Commissioner is authorized, at the expense of the
League, to hire legal counsel and take or adopt appropriate
legal action or such other steps or procedures as he deems
necessary and proper in the best interests of either the League
or professional football, whenever a party or organization not
a member of, employed by, or connected with the League or
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(b).
See 2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 2-7.
2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, §3-6.
2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 7(a).
2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 7(b).
2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 7(b).
2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(d).
Pacifici, supra note 7, at 103.
Pacifici, supra note 7, at 103.
Pacifici, supra note 7, at 103-04.
Pacifici, supra note 7, at 103-04 (citing NFL CONST. art VIII, § 6 (2006)).
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any member thereof is guilty of any conduct detrimental to
the League,
its member clubs or employees, or to professional
football.86
The NFL is unique in that one can only appeal disciplinary decisions
to the Commissioner; this may make the NFL’s disciplinary process seem
much harsher than those of other professional sports leagues.87 The NFL
CBA primarily covers playing rules, with a particular focus on player
safety.88 There is an attempt to clarify the ambiguous powers of the
Commissioner in the CBA, but the language utilized to ameliorate the
ambiguity is itself ambiguous.89 The real issue of the ambiguity revolves
around the Commissioner’s ability to punish “conduct detrimental to the
integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional
football . . . .”90 This language is so broad and undefined that it could
allow the Commissioner to interpret any transgression as fitting this
category. Such authority is woefully unfair to players. The full list of the
Commissioner’s disciplinary authority is outlined in Article 8, Section
13, of the NFL Constitution, and is beyond the scope of this note,
especially considering much of the constitution is inapplicable to player
discipline.91 Also, there is a further expansion of his powers within the
form player contract in Appendix A of the NFL CBA.92 Section 15 of
the form contract is entitled “Integrity of the Game.”93 With this section,
“the NFL Commissioner possesses the authority to discipline a player for
‘conduct detrimental’ to the League under the NFL constitution, the NFL
CBA, and a standard form NFL player contract.”94 Ostensibly, the NFL
Commissioner seems to have a despotic rule above all others. However,
along with the intricate minutia of how each Commissioner enacts
discipline, there is a unifying clause in all of the major sports leagues that
augments their power beyond reason.
E. The Ubiquity of “The Best Interest of the League” Clause
The concept of a commissioner as protector of a league’s integrity
dates back to the very creation of the position. The inception of a “sports
commissioner” came in 1921 in the MLB as a response to the “Black

86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

NFL CONST. art VIII, § 6 (2006).
Wilson, supra note 17, at 49.
Wilson, supra note 17, at 49.
Pacifici, supra note 7, at 104.
2011 NFL CBA, supra note 6, at 204.
NFL CONST. art VIII, § 13 (2006).
2011 NFL CBA, supra note 6, at 256; Pacifici, supra note 7, at 104.
2011 NFL CBA, supra note 6, at 256.
Pacifici, supra note 7, at 104.
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Sox” scandal of the 1919 World Series.95 The original purpose of the
MLB Commissioner was to serve as the ethical center of the sport,
protecting its integrity and preventing ills, such as gambling, from
blemishing it.96 Following the MLB’s decision, the other three major
sports leagues eventually instituted the position of commissioner.97 The
external limitations placed on each leagues’ commissioners can be found,
primarily, in the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and, most
likely, the First Amendment of the Constitution.98
However, despite these external encumbrances, it seems as though
each league has found a similar way to strengthen the authority of their
respective commissioners. As mentioned in each of the following
sections, one of the commonalities we see amongst all four of the major
sports leagues is language that gives the Commissioners authority to
maintain the “best interests of the sport.”99 As such, they all are given
substantial discretionary power that goes beyond certain textual
limitations in order to maintain the ethereal essence of the sport. 100 This
extends to behavior both on and off the court, field, or ice that would
challenge the integrity of the league.101 Apart from the expansive
language of the clause, the “integrity” of each league is not specifically
defined, and, therefore, it falls to each Commissioner to use his own
judgment to determine what must be done to uphold this integrity. 102 This
authority is so far-reaching that no violation of any league rule is required
for it to be activated, which severely limits the autonomy of league
members beholden to the rules.103 While this “best interest” authority is
not unlimited, considering it is constrained by the aforementioned CBA
and Constitutional language, it is nonetheless significant.104 When the
enumerated powers of each league’s commissioner are coupled with the
authority of this clause, it becomes evident how each commissioner is
similarly situated in their control over their respective sport in terms of
disciplinary action.
III. ANALYSIS OF LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF COMMISSIONER DISCIPLINE
95
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ILLUSTRATED BY DEFLATEGATE
There are many intricacies in the world of sports that could require
legal intervention. In 2015 alone, there were five major sports issues that
arose across the nation: (1) free markets for college athletes; (2) college
athletes’ right to unionize; (3) legalization of sports gambling; (4)
antitrust litigation over territorial restraints and blackout rules; and (5) the
NFL Commissioner’s disciplinary authority. 105 While some of these
issues may be external to the actual sport and its regulations, they
implicate major areas of law from antitrust law to labor law.106 When
reviewing the Deflategate controversy, one of the most prominent sportslaw issues, the authority of sports commissioners is brought to light.107
This case is worth review not only because it is topical, but also because
it illustrates the legal ramifications of the unfettered power of sports
commissioners and how it should be mitigated through legislation.
A. Deflategate: Before the Courts
Deflategate involved Tom Brady using underinflated footballs in the
2015 AFC championship game.108 In that game, the Colts’ safety, Mike
Adams, intercepted Tom Brady twice and the Colts kept both balls,
because the team believed the balls were not inflated correctly.109 It was
reported that eleven of the twelve footballs allowed to the Patriots were
under the NFL’s required range of 12.5 to 13.5 pounds per square inch.110
It was also reported that the game referee, Walt Anderson, inspected the
balls two hours and fifteen minutes before the game began, in accordance
with protocol.111 As a result, the NFL hired Ted Wells as the leagueappointed attorney to complete an in-depth investigation into the
matter.112 The investigation culminated in a 243-page report that
implicated Tom Brady, as well as some of the Patriots’ staff members.113
The primary conclusion was that Tom Brady was probably “at least
105
Marc Edelman, Top Five Sports Law Stories for 2015, FORBES (Jan. 6, 2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2015/01/06/top-5-sports-law-stories-for-2015/2/#
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generally aware” that the footballs used were underinflated.114 The report
also posited the likelihood “that Jim McNally [the Official Locker Room
attendant for the Patriots] and John Jastremski [an equipment assistant for
the Patriots] participated in a deliberate effort to release air from the
Patriots’ game balls after they were examined by the referee.”115 There
were also text messages exchanged between the two staffers discussing
footballs and their level of inflation.116 However, the report found no
conclusive evidence implicating the team coach, Bill Belichick, or team
management in the deflation practice.117
Due to these findings, the NFL ruled that Tom Brady would be
suspended without pay for the first four games of the 2015-2016 NFL
season.118 The NFL also decided to take punitive action against the New
England Patriots team, fining it $1 million and taking away its 2016 firstround and 2017 fourth-round draft picks.119 The Patriots issued a
statement expressing its belief that the findings of the Wells Report were
incomplete, and that the report did not include evidence of the natural
reduction of PSI in the footballs.120 The statement also said there was no
evidence that Tom Brady had a preference for underinflated balls. 121 In
spite of this, the Patriots decided not to appeal the decision of the NFL. 122
However, the National Football League’s Players’ Association appealed
the decision on Tom Brady’s behalf.123 After deciding not to recuse
himself from the internal appeal hearing, Commissioner Goodell upheld
the suspension based on the protection of the “integrity of the game,”
something he held to be the most important of the commissioner’s
duties.124 Part of this decision was a result of Brady instructing his
assistant to destroy his cell phone that he used since November—a period
of time including the AFC Championship game and the early
investigation—the day he was interviewed by Ted Wells. 125 As a result
of their inability to reach any sort of resolution, Brady and Goodell went
before Judge Richard M. Berman of the United States District Court for
114
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the Southern District of New York.126 The judge urged them to settle, but
ultimately decided that the positions of the parties were too disparate and
that he would hand down a ruling. 127
B. NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n
While the judge addressed the court’s usual deference to an
arbitrator’s findings and accepted his findings, he nevertheless decided
that the decision should be vacated.128 The award in favor of Brady was
granted on three legal grounds:
(A) inadequate notice to Brady of both his potential discipline
(four-game suspension) and his alleged misconduct; (B)
denial of the opportunity for Brady to examine one of two
lead investigators, namely NFL Executive Vice President and
General Counsel Jeff Pash; and (C) denial of equal access
to
investigative files, including witness interview notes.129
In response to Brady’s lack of suspension notice, the court drew a
parallel between the NFL’s decision and how the league treats steroid
use.130 The court found that Brady had no notice of a possible suspension
equivalent to the use of performance-enhancing drugs or general
awareness of a scheme to deflate footballs.131 The court also found that
the suspension could not be based on Brady’s failure to cooperate with
an ensuing investigation.132 While Goodell thought suspending Brady
was consistent with the practice of punishing steroid use—reasoning that
both gave the violators a competitive advantage—the court disagreed.133
As a result, the court held that no player alleged or found to have had
general awareness of inappropriate ball deflation by other parties and
failed to cooperate with the investigation could be considered to have
reasonable notice of a punishment equivalent to NFL Policy on Anabolic
Steroid and Related Substances use.134
Based on this reasoning, the court found additional grounds to
vacate Brady’s suspension.135 The court found that Brady’s general
awareness of a scheme to deflate footballs did not amount to notice of
possible punitive action.136 The court concluded that, “as a matter of law,
126
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no NFL policy or precedent notifies players that they may be disciplined
(much less suspended) for general awareness of misconduct by others.”137
The lack of precedent within the NFL, thus, violated the “law of the
shop”: “A rule must clearly and unambiguously establish the scope of
prohibited conduct, as well as the consequences of violations, in order to
be enforceable . . . .”138 The “law of the shop” refers to “when an
arbitrator enforces a past practice,” something that was not applicable
here due to lack of precedent.139
Finally, the court distinguished between notice of a fine and notice
of a suspension.140 The court found that, under the Player’s Policy, a
player has notice of a potential fine.141 However, Brady was punished
under the Competitive Integrity Policy, which is only incorporated in the
Game Operations Manual that applies to the chief executive, presidents,
general managers, and head coaches—but not players.142 Goodell, in
response, contended that conduct detrimental to the league, rather than
the Competitive Integrity Policy, was the basis for Brady’s
punishment.143 The court stated that a player’s right to notice is
quintessential to the CBA, as well as criminal and civil justice systems. 144
The court’s holding in favor of Brady was also based on past NFL arbitral
precedent that the lack of notice of the Competitive Integrity Policy is
grounds for dispensing with punishment.145
In terms of conduct detrimental to the league, the court dismissed
that argument based on NFL precedent.146 For example, in the domestic
violence cases of Ray Rice and Adrian Peterson, the NFL initially
punished them on the grounds of conduct detrimental to the league, but
ultimately punished them based on the NFL’s policy against domestic
violence.147 As such, the situations are not analogous. Also, the court
found that Brady was denied equal opportunity to examine Co-Lead
Investigator Jeff Pash.148 NFL precedent dictates that, in Article 46
arbitration appeals, players must be given the opportunity to confront
137
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their investigators.149 Consequently, Brady was unfairly prejudiced.150
In that same vein, the court found that Goodell improperly denied Brady
equal access to investigative files.151 Lastly, Brady contended that
Goodell was “evidently partial” within the meaning of 9 U.S.C. §
10(a)(2), which will be essential to the legislation this paper proposes.152
C. Goodell’s Appeal: NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n
In the wake of the court’s decision, Goodell appealed the case to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.153 The Second
Circuit reversed the ruling of the lower court on several grounds.154 First,
in regards to the Player Policies, the circuit court agreed that the policies
did not apply, but did not foreclose the possibility of suspensions. 155
Normally, under the Player Policies, tampering with equipment only
called for a fine.156 While the policy under the Other Uniform/Equipment
Violations section mentions nothing about tampering with balls, the court
found that Article 46 gives the Commissioner broad authority to deal with
conduct that goes against the integrity of the game.157 Also, while this
section cites fines for first-time offenses, the court noted that these fines
are minimums and can be augmented based on the severity of the
violation.158
In terms of the steroid comparison, the circuit court found little issue
with it, in contrast with the lower court.159 The court recognized that
arbitrators are given broad latitude in their decisions.160 While Brady had
the right to notice of potential punishment, there is no enumerated right
that Brady is given notice to analogies made by the arbitrator that would
inform their decision.161 Thus, while the court found the comparison
imperfect, the Commissioner was still within his rights, because this issue
was not essential for his punishment.162
In regards to the issue of awareness of the underinflated balls, the
149
150
151
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court found that the Wells Report did not limit itself to the standard of
general awareness, but rather that report determined that was the most
likely level of awareness, rather than direct involvement or potential
awareness.163 The real issue here for the Commissioner was whether the
discipline he imposed was within his Article 46 powers to protect the
integrity of the league.164 The court found that, in conjunction with the
evidence presented from the Wells Report, and other exigent
circumstances surrounding the investigation, there was a factual basis for
Goodell to determine that Brady committed a punishable offense.165
Therefore, the court held that the Commissioner was within his rights to
find that Brady participated in conduct detrimental to the league.166
The court also found that there were grounds to punish Brady for
non-cooperation with the investigation.167 Again the court found that the
league had authority under Article 46 detrimental conduct, but also
because of Brady’s general notice of the investigation.168 The court
reasoned that Brady was on notice of potential punishment for destroying
his phone when he received a letter from the league stating that he failed
“to cooperate fully and candidly with the investigation, including by
refusing to produce any relevant electronic evidence (emails, texts,
etc.).”169 Also, the court noted that any reasonable litigant would
understand that the destruction of evidence days before an arbitration
hearing would be a substantial issue.170 The court also dismissed the issue
of the Competitive Integrity Policy, stating the Brady was clearly being
punished under Article 46.171
On the issue of exclusion of testimony from the NFL General
Counsel, the court found that any of Pash’s insight into the matter was
collateral to the arbitration and it was not necessary that Brady be privy
to it.172 The court also found that the Commissioner did not receive any
extensive information from any of the members of counsel that fell
beyond that of the Wells Report and what was disclosed in hearings and
the previous case.173 With regard to the denial of access to investigative
files, the court found that the Commissioner himself did not rely on any
163
164
165
166
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170
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internal interview notes in making his decision.174 Therefore, it was not
unreasonable for him to assume that Brady would require access to
them.175 Finally, the court found no merit to the issue of the
Commissioner being an evidently partial arbitrator.176 The court cited,
yet again, the Article 46 authority of the Commissioner to determine what
constitutes conduct detrimental to the league.177 As such, the Second
Circuit reinstated the four-game suspension and the fine.178
IV. LEGISLATION IN OPPOSITION TO THE “BEST INTEREST OF THE
LEAGUE” CLAUSE
A. Why Commissioner’s Broad Authority Is Unfair and Creates
Wide-Ranging Problems
In the wake of the Second Circuit’s decision, Brady decided not to
appeal the decision to the Supreme Court, accepting the suspension.179
While it is unclear how the Supreme Court would have ruled, the decision
clearly illustrates the overly-broad authority delegated to Roger Goodell
in his duty to protect the best interest of the league. 180 Further, the issue
is not limited to the NFL Commissioner, as illustrated in Part II. So, the
question remains: what can be done?
One might ask: Why is change necessary, considering that these
leagues are extremely profitable and popular?181 Apart from the looming
issues of player dissatisfaction in some of the leagues,182 issues may also
arise when each leagues’ CBA expires and it becomes time for the
players’ unions and the leagues to renegotiate.183 Firstly, as the
commissioners’ authorities increase, discipline is likely to increase,
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resulting in the loss of salary through suspensions and fines, which can
be significant for lower level players who do not play as long and make
less money.184 Another reason relates more to player freedom, regarding
whether players should be suspended for non-sports affiliated
activities.185 A commissioner does not need to wait for a guilty verdict
in a criminal matter to punish a player for actions he finds detrimental to
the sport.186 This practice goes against the societal and legal norm of
innocent until proven guilty; however, sports leagues are private
organizations that players enter freely. 187 Nevertheless, this still is an
incentive for players to want to renegotiate.188
A secondary question is whether or not leagues should fine players
for non-criminal activity that occurred off the court.189 There are serious
implications here that could violate a player’s right to free speech, and
put their political, religious, and social beliefs at risk.190 As players begin
to act out in different ways, new rules are promulgated to regulate their
behavior.191 Any player that feels as though the league has too much
control over his personal life may feel disenchanted with the sport and
face further action due to acts of frustration.192
A final consideration for why legislation is necessary is the
economic ramifications of dissatisfaction with commissioner authority
that could result in strikes and lockouts.193 One such example is the 20112012 NBA season lockout.194 While this strike was primarily based on
the allocation of money from various sources, the economic effects are
explanatory.195 Because of the reduction of the season from eighty-two
to sixty-six games, the players lost roughly twenty percent of their
salaries.196 The NBA players are guaranteed 51.2% of all basketballrelated income.197 The lockout resulted in a revenue loss of about $3.3
billion, half of which was borne by the players.198 If legislation was
184
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enacted to settle any disputes that could arise during a CBA negotiation
year, it could result in the saving of millions, if not billions, of dollars.
Examining how the commissioners are compensated in comparison
to the average player is illustrative of how entrenched the position of
commissioner is and raises questions of self-dealing. This further
indicates a need to mitigate commissioner positions in the major sports
leagues. Respectively, the average salaries for players in the NBA, MLB,
NHL, and NFL (in 2014) and their potential career earnings are as
follows: $5.15 million, $3.2 million, $2.4 million, and $1.9 million.199
Over the course of an average NBA, MLB, NHL, and NFL career, these
averages, respectively, allow for career earnings of: $24.7 million, $17.9
million, $13.2 million, and $6.7 million.200 These figures, when
compared to the salaries of the commissioners of these leagues, show a
stark contrast in the yearly and career earning potentials. Based on
figures from 2010, Bud Selig, the Commissioner of the MLB, earned
$18.35 million in 2007, with only ten players earning more than him at
the time.201 The NFL Commissioner was the second highest earner,
taking in $8 million in 2009, after taking a twenty-five percent pay cut.202
The third and fourth highest paid commissioners were the NBA and NHL
Commissioners, earning a “modest” $10 and $7.2 million respectively.203
These figures have likely increased in the near decade that has passed
since their recording, as have the players’ averages, but the contrast is
still as appalling. These earning figures become even more concerning
when considering the recent history of the duration of sports
commissioners’ tenure. The previous NBA Commissioner, David Stern,
served for thirty years in his position.204 The next longest tenured
commissioners are the previous MLB Commissioner Bud Selig who
served for twenty-four years, including time as active and formal
Commissioner,205 and NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman who has served
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for roughly the same amount of time.206 While NFL Commissioner
Roger Goodell has only served since 2006, a meager eleven years, he is
an example of the self-dealing inherent to the position.207 It is widely
known that Goodell was groomed for the job by his predecessor, Paul
Tagliabue, as was the current NBA Commissioner Adam Silver.208 While
the owners are required to vote, the unanimity in both instances strongly
suggests a dynastic system.
Some people have offered alternatives to legislation, such as a player
conduct policy (“PCP”).209 This would undoubtedly be something
generated by CBA negotiations, rather than unilaterally by either the
players or the league.210 A PCP would specifically enumerate how
players are meant to comport themselves, alleviating some confusion. 211
However, the specifics would have to be negotiated, which could result
in a lockout or ambiguous rules.212 Furthermore, PCP would still leave
the issue of player autonomy off the court, and would do little to lessen
the “best interest of the league” authority, which “[s]cholars have
criticized [because] this model of a commissioner sitting as accuser,
judge, and jury . . . gives rise to perceived, if not real, bias.”213 As
previously alluded to, this could run afoul of restriction of “evident
partiality or corruption in the arbitrators” provision of 9 U.S.C. §
10(a)(2).214
As such, proposed legislation that would make ambiguous clauses,
such as the “best interest of the league” clause, a violation of players’
rights would be beneficial. This legislation could stand on its own or
become a provision of some other federal legislation, such as the Federal
Labor Relations Act. Congress would have the authority to implement
such legislation under the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution, which allows regulation of interstate commerce, and would
apply to all major sports leagues. The primary issue here is that many of
the leagues have teams in Canada, which would require a separate source
of authority.
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This legislation would require each league to specifically enumerate
all possible infractions punishable as players of the league, if they do not
go so far as to infringe upon their First Amendment rights. The
legislation would also prevent athletes from being punished for criminal
behavior if they are not found guilty. Finally, the legislation would
require that all disciplinary hearings be appealable to a panel of
arbitrators, independent of the league. The panel would be provided by
one or several outside arbitration sources to ensure impartiality. The
players’ union and the league will retain the right to remove one or
multiple arbitrators from the panel at any time, if they can show good
cause. In such an instance, they would have no say in the replacement
arbitrators.
B. Privacy and Constitutional Rights Legislation
This section will propose extensions of privacy laws and stateadopted constitutional principles in order to mitigate major sports
leagues’ commissioner authority to take punitive actions. This section
will not argue that there are alterations to commissioner authority in
regard to on-field and other related activities, because those powers are
strongly enumerated and extend beyond the scope of its purpose.215 The
first legislative proposal addresses how players are often subject to
double punishment for criminal activity, as well as an invasion of their
rights to privacy during legal proceedings that do not involve the sports
leagues. This parallels a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.216 Traditionally, this provision has
offered three constitutional protections: (1) protection from a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) protection against a
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3)
protection against multiple punishments for the same offense.217
Admittedly, this does not apply here, because double jeopardy only
applies to government action,218 but that is why there is a call for
legislation to mirror its applicability to private entities. There is clear
precedent for expanding constitutional protections through either state or
federal action. One example of a state law expanding constitutional rights
is N.J.S.A. 2A: 161A-1.219 As explained in State v. Evans, this statute
expands the rights of detainees relating to unlawful search and seizure,
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which is derived originally from the Fourth Amendment.220 If players
were to be punished or acquitted by the courts only to face punishment
from the league, it would completely contravene this essential
Constitutional principal. Many state constitutions have adopted the
principle of double jeopardy and can apply it as they see fit, as long as it
does not contradict Supreme Court precedent.221 As such, “[s]tate courts
can also interpret any double jeopardy clauses in their own state
constitutions which often provide more protection than that which is
afforded by the federal constitution since the minimum standards under
the U.S. Constitution always apply.” 222 States that have adopted heftier
protections include: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, and
Texas.223 With enhanced protections like these extended to athletes and
fines for non-sports related offenses, the ability of commissioners to
commit double jeopardy violations would be extinguished.
While this is an extreme example, and there are other exigencies that
would need to be considered, the case of Aaron Hernandez is informative
in how a sports league could violate the principle of double jeopardy. 224
In an effort to avoid a publicity nightmare, Roger Goodell made it a point
to wait until Aaron Hernandez was convicted of murder to suspend
him.225 Obviously, suspending Hernandez subsequent to his conviction
would make little sense considering the charges would call for a life
sentence, but the point still stands.226 Assuming a player was convicted
of a more innocuous crime, like drug possession, a conviction could
warrant a suspension or fine in the eyes of a league commissioner,
providing double punishment. This note proposes that legislation should
be created that would prevent sports leagues from punishing players for
crimes, at least of the non-violent nature. This is not meant to promote
non-violent crimes, such as marijuana use, but to protect players as
private citizens.
In fact, it could be argued that such treatment by sports leagues
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perpetuate a false narrative about athletes as criminals, bordering on
defamation. As players in the most popular sport in America, many
players rise to the level of public figures, but the way many are
represented in the media, and the way leagues handle such publicity,
often casts them in a false light.227 Taking the NFL—the league with the
most players—as an example, demonstrates that athletes are generally
less likely to commit crimes than the average person, despite the rampant
reports of misconduct.228 One study found that the rates of pro-athletes
committing assault or domestic violence were half that of the general
population.229 However, teams and leagues do not view players as
people, but rather as market commodities that can bring in great revenue,
but also terrible publicity.230 Teams have often stood by players in
support of them, adhering to the principle of “innocent until proven
guilty.” However, many teams and leagues are quick to repudiate their
stars in order to protect their own image, even at the expense of the
players involved.231 While this would likely be protected under free
speech, teams and leagues alike should be wary of speaking too soon on
an issue.
C. Arbitration Legislation
It has been established that the “best interest of the league” clause is
detrimental to sports and players, promoting this proposal for legislation.
The clause gives commissioners too much authority, even when there is
an arbitration process involved. The proposal would create legislation
that would include a uniform arbitration process across all of the major
sports leagues. This process would serve to be impartial, as well as strip
the “best interest of the league” authority from the Commissioners.
The proposal would mandate that arbitration for any transgression
related to the sport be brought before an impartial panel comprised of
arbitrators that work independently of any league. The process would be
similar to standing arbitration process in the MLB, but with certain
distinctions.232 A list of names would be provided by an independent
arbitration entity—one that the players’ association and the league have
agreed upon.233 Once a consensus is reached about who the arbitrators
227
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will be, then the process can continue. If either party has an issue with
any of the arbitrators, they will have to show cause to have them removed
from the panel. Examples of justifiable cause could be that the arbitrator
is biased or unqualified or not in the right state-of-mind to participate in
the proceedings, but there must be cause. It will not be the case, like in
the MLB arbitration system, that a party can remove an arbitrator at their
whim. Nor will it be like in voir dire where each party receives a certain
number of jurors that they may dismiss without cause. If adequate cause
cannot be shown, the arbitrator will remain on the panel. At the end of
the arbitration, if either party is not satisfied, they can take the matter to
the courts. However, if a party chooses to litigate the matter and is
unsuccessful, the losing party will be responsible for the opposing party’s
attorney’s fees.
This system will allow for a truly fair way to determine what
punishment is suitable for a given transgression, especially when the
constitution, by-laws, and the CBA are ambiguous on an issue. If such
an issue of ambiguity arises, the team owners will vote on how it will be
interpreted, and the arbitrators can proceed from there. It is still up to the
players’ associations and the leagues to negotiate the CBAs and what
infractions are punishable, but the punishments will not be left to parties
that have a vested interest in the outcome. Only with these legislative
changes will players, in all types of situations, be treated fairly and
impartially.
V. CONCLUSION
In summation, since the inception of the position in 1921, the
authority of sports commissioners has grown to an unacceptable level.
Primarily driven by the “best interest of the league clause,”
commissioners’ power must be checked through legislation in order to
promote the best interests not only of the leagues, but also their numerous
players. Without such legislation, players will remain in the precarious
position of negotiating CBAs that leave them open to unfair disciplinary
action.

